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Depression and Moral Health: A Response to the
Commentary
Mike W. Martin

S. Nassir Ghaemi tells us that whereas "neurologists are sometimes accused of admiring
disease rather than treating it," psychiatrists seek to cure disease even when they do not
understand it. At the same time, he notes that Freud had both theoretical and practical
interests that occasionally point in different directions, and psychiatrists have learned that
theoretical understanding of the sources of suffering does not always translate directly into
useful clinical practice. For their part, philosophers are often criticized for indulging in
armchair speculation that yields neither empirical understanding nor practical efficacy.
Writing as a philosopher in "Depression: Illness, Insight, and Identity," I had hoped to
engage both scientific and therapeutic interests while linking them to humanistic concerns
about values. Ghaemi's emphasis is primarily therapeutic--to help, to heal--but he seems
generally sympathetic to my goal of integrating moral and therapeutic perspectives. I
benefited from his cautions about the need to pursue that integration with close attention to
therapeutic imperatives.
My essay is part of a larger project of interweaving morality and therapy as applied to an
array of human problems, or rather of elaborating on an integration that has already evolved
in our society, and which now permeates self-help literature, talk shows, sermons, and
much psychotherapy (Martin 1999b). This integration resonates with Plato's daring intuition
in Republic that morality and mental health are fundamentally linked through a concept of
moral health. Moral health is something more than a metaphor. It refers to active capacities
that are essential for both moral life and psychological coping. But Plato went too far when
he equated virtue and mental health: "Virtue is as it were the health and comeliness and
well-being of the soul, as wickedness is disease, deformity, and weakness" (1945, trans.
Cornford). So did humanistic psychologists, such as Erich Fromm, who attempted to derive
moral principles from psychological facts (1947). Certainly we must not make moral
judgments about dementia, consider episodic wrongdoing simply pathological, or lapse into
the patronizing notion that the higher reaches of moral commitment are merely signs of
sound health. Nevertheless, I am convinced that Plato glimpsed a larger truth than his critics
allow (Kenny 1973).
Certainly we need to dissolve any rigid dichotomy between moral and therapeutic
perspectives on depression, while still appreciating that different practical purposes warrant
different emphases. Two powerful trends have undermined the moral/therapeutic dichotomy
during the twentieth century, and yet have also made it difficult to see [End Page 295]
where we now stand. On one hand, the therapeutic trend has medicalized moral problems
by approaching them in terms of health and therapy. On the other, the unmasking trend

reveals that therapy itself embodies moral values, thereby debunking its pretension to
function as a morally neutral replacement for morality. Both trends are at work, for
example, in the case of alcoholism.
Alcoholism is a disease, according to the dominant view in the therapeutic community.
Citizens and law enforcement agencies, however, continue to regard alcohol abuse as
something for which individuals should be held accountable. Furthermore, Alcoholics
Anonymous, the most popular form of alcoholism therapy, conjoins an insistence that
alcoholism is a disease with moral (and religious) values about accepting personal
responsibility. In my view, alcoholism is typically both a sickness and something which
involves wrongdoing (Martin 1999a). It is a sickness insofar as it constitutes impaired
agency, and it is concerned with wrongdoing insofar as it violates responsibilities to care for
one's health and to be accountable for one's drinking behavior. Responsibility does not
vanish once alcoholism has ravaged one's capacity directly to control drinking, for even
then there remains a duty on the alcoholic's part to seek and to cooperate with available
therapeutic help. Nevertheless, the different social constituencies dealing with alcoholics
have strikingly different emphases: therapists emphasize nonjudgmental helping, law
enforcement personnel accentuate punishment for alcohol-related crimes, insurance
companies focus on alcoholism's cost liabilities, and legislators formulate laws that provide
incentives for responsible drinking behavior. All of these emphases overlap at various
junctures, and as a society, we need a comprehensive perspective that renders them
coherent.
To look at another example, analogous differences in emphasis are inevitable and even
desirable in thinking about depression, given the varying and sometimes conflicting
concerns of sufferers, agents coping with problems, health care providers, theoreticians in
psychiatry and the social sciences, groups that pay for medical care, and the depressed
person's family and community. But again, like alcoholism, we need a comprehensive
vision of the interplay of illness and insight, pathology and personal meaning, and health
and moral values in depression. Like alcohol dependency, depression generates questions
about responsibility. As a general point, recently noted by Lawrence Becker, both mental
and moral health exclude the crippling forms of severe depression; they exclude any of "the
basic personality tenors (phobias, distrust, pessimism, depression) that paralyze agency or
render agents unable to feel or express empathy, or unable to take a benevolent interest in
others" (Becker 1998, 104). What I said about depression impairing autonomy is germane
to responsibility issues, but my primary focus was elsewhere--on personal meaning and
values.
Ghaemi rightly insists that severe pathological depression "almost always interferes with
the free, rational exercise of moral agency due to cognitive distortions." Equally important,
he insists that severe depression needs treatment, and that its value aspects should not
sanction avoiding help--a dangerous practice that results in part from the cognitive and
emotional distortions involved in severe depression, and in part from the continuing social
stigma of mental illness. All of these points are consistent with what I said in discussing
Peter Kramer, but they deserve the emphasis Ghaemi gives to them. Ghaemi is also on
target when he says that I failed to distinguish between insights that occur during or after a

state of depression. Severe depression is perhaps rarely a source of insights while it lasts,
given the emotional and cognitive inhibition it causes. Mill's insights came after, and in
light of his suffering, not during it.
Value judgments enter the discussion in another way. Ghaemi outlines the "depressive
realism" approach to understanding depression, an approach that finds some correlation
between a state of mild depression and a realistic grasp of the world. I alluded to that
literature without emphasizing it. If anything, I discussed psychoanalytic perspectives more
extensively, while also taking account of biochemical and cognitive-behavioral approaches.
My themes cut across the varied psychological-psychiatric perspectives, and I did not
intend to make a "conceptual argument" for associating depression with insight, especially
if "insight" connotes accurate perception. [End Page 296] Ghaemi cites his own and others'
studies suggesting that insight is correlated at most with the milder forms of depression, and
that finding is consistent with my views.
I emphasize again, however, that my paper dealt with identity and values more than with
"insights" into facts about the world. Empirical studies tend to focus on how depression
affects one's knowledge of facts ("reality testing") and to neglect value judgments and their
connections with one's changes in identity and wider perspectives on life. Value judgments
can be studied empirically, but only as to: (i) how depression shapes individuals' beliefs
about values (rather than whether the values themselves are valid); and (ii) the extent to
which those value beliefs are adaptive or socially effective, according to a given standard.
Hence, empirical studies would help us better understand when depression is beneficial
("adaptive") or harmful only if we begin with value assumptions that have not themselves
been proven empirically. Moreover, depression-linked changes in a person's values and
identity need not be changes for the better, contrary to the impression my essay may have
created. Autonomy and authenticity do not always produce more substantive moral
behaviors.
Actually, Ghaemi makes a number of extremely interesting observations about depression
and values. Whereas I emphasized personal meaning, while taking some note of Mill's
contributions to the history of ethics, Ghaemi shifts to social and political results. He
discusses the coping and social contributions of depression, even the occasional political
and military value of presidents and generals who suffered from something far more severe
than normal depression. Coping has normative connotations in that it presupposes a
framework of what counts as proper social adjustment; for example, seeking to win a war
rather than shunning war as pacifists would urge. Ghaemi also makes illuminating
comments about the coping value of selective ignorance and inattention. I would add that
those comments pertain to many more human conditions than depression. For example, they
relate to understanding and morally assessing self-deception (Martin 1986; Lockard and
Paulhus 1988; Taylor 1989).
Although Ghaemi finds my discussion of the moral aspects of therapy apt, perhaps more
needs to be said. My blending of moral and therapeutic perspectives tends to favor therapies
that complement medication with counseling. Although such therapy is still common, it is
increasingly at risk because of the relative convenience and lower cost of medication alone

as compared to counseling services. A biopsychosocial--and moral--understanding of
human beings should lead us to celebrate pharmaceutical treatments while still continuing
to appreciate the value explorations that play a key role in psychotherapy.
Finally, Ghaemi challenges my suggestion that most depression is not a sickness. He says
this claim is an empirical assertion subject to scientific investigation, and he doubts whether
it will be confirmed. I would note a few complexities in conducting such studies. Empirical
investigations need to begin with plausible and agreed-upon definitions of what depression
is, something which neither Ghaemi nor I offered. (I only cited the DSM-IV definition of
Major Depressive Disorder.) When I suggested that most depression is not a sickness, I had
in mind that depression (as distinct from sadness or fatigue but overlapping with despair) is
a mood of low spirits or dejection centered around a sense of worthlessness or hopelessness,
either about life as a whole or about specific engagements with the world. I also noted how
Aaron Beck (1967) restricted the term depression to abnormal states, and I suspect the
everyday work of psychiatrists might prompt similar biases in acknowledging the frequency
of "normal" depression. In addition, empirical studies must rely on a plausible definition of
psychopathology or mental disorder. Here we should be careful in how we respond to the
cultural trend of associating mental health with high self-esteem, confidence, and happiness
in ways that automatically render depression suspect. If we use a broad definition of
depression combined with the current DSM-IV definition of mental disorders, then perhaps
my claim is not implausible.
Perhaps we can draw a rough analogy with jealousy, as found in erotic love and a great
many other areas of life. Many a lover will testify that intense jealousy is unpleasant, albeit
not exactly [End Page 297] in the way depression is (although the two can be found in
tandem). Some jealousy is pathological, but much of it is normal and healthy. It is plausible
to view jealousy as an adaptive emotional response that evolved to help protect erotic love
and other caring relationships by functioning as a warning about threats to them. To be sure,
an opposing attitude emerged during the 1960s, according to which all jealousy is a sign of
immaturity and even pathology. That difference in value perspectives mirrors, on a smaller
scale, disagreements about the extent to which depression should be pathologized in a
society that insists on continual cheerfulness at the workplace. I agree that today
pathological depression is far more common than pathological jealousy, but I would also
guess that normal depression is as commonplace as normal jealousy. In any case, here as
elsewhere, value judgments will shape empirical investigations and interpretations.
In concluding, I thank Dr. Ghaemi for his stimulating comments, which have strengthened
my sense of the need for integrating moral and therapeutic perspectives. Just as therapy has
clear moral implications, morality should become increasingly attuned to psychological
understanding and to therapeutic values of healing and personal growth. The primary
juncture at which that attunement occurs is moral psychology--psychology of the moral life,
and moral aspects of psychology--a field that is only recently emerging from the shadow of
debates about abstract ethical theories on right and wrong. Those theories themselves stand
to benefit from greater psychological realism and nuanced integration with a compassionate
therapeutic vision in responding to human suffering.
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